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Do We Have a "New" Macroeconomy?
J. Bradford DeLong, University of Calfornia, Berkeley
Executive Summary
Claims that we are in a "new economy" have become less strident over the past
year with the collapse of Internet-company stock valuations. Nevertheless,
the smart way to bet is that the data processing and data communications revo-
lutions have significantly altered and will continue to alter the structure
of the macroeconomy and the pattern of the business cycle. The information-
technology revolution is the prime candidate for driving the acceleration in
aggregate labor productivity growth in the 1990s, and the boom in informa-
tion-technology investment promises to pay dividends in the form of acceler-
ated aggregate labor productivity growth for at least a decade to come. It is a
credible candidate for driving the reduction in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment (the NAIRU). It may well promise to diminish the aggregate economy's
vulnerability to inventory fluctuations, which have for more than a century
been a principal driving force behind the business cycle.
I.Introduction
Claims that we are in a "new economy" are less strident than a year
ago. The crash of the technology-heavy NASDAQ market (figure 5.1),
the end of the tech-heavy IPO boom, and the inability of investment
analysts today to recall why they placed such high valuations on tech-
nology leaders only a few months ago1 have silenced voices that used
to claim that the old economic rules had been superseded. Odds are
that enthusiasm for the "new economy" wifi cool still more, for the
stock market appears to have further to fall.2
But just as the conventional wisdom over much of the past half de-
cade was irrationally exuberant, so current opinion is in danger of be-
coming overpessimistic. That the U.S. economy is in danger of falling
into recession, that unemployment rates are likely to rise throughout
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downward as well as upwardthese facts are not relevant to the im-
portant and interesting structural issues. As I wrote two years ago, the
new economy is "not about ...smooth growth, permanently rising
stock prices ... or permanently low rates of unemployment, interest
and inflation."3 Instead, the new economy is about whether the ongo-
ing technological revolutions are doing for information processing and
organizational control something like what the technological revolu-
tions of the nineteenth-century industrial revolution did for materials
processing and transportation.4
Are these ongoing technological revolutions powerful enough for us
to see their impact on the macroeconomythe patterns of trends and
fluctuations exhibited by aggregate indicators like real GDP, the unem-
ployment rate, inflation, and so forth? The smart way to bet is "yes." It
seems likelyalthough not yet certainthat the data processing and
data communications revolutions have significantly altered and will
continue to alter the structure of the macroeconomy and pattern of the
business cycle. Specifically:
The information technology revolution has almost surely driven the
recent acceleration in American productivity growth, and there is
good reason to believe that productivity growth will continue at its
current, higher rate for at least a decade.
- NASDAQ
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A likely important macroeconomic consequence of the acceleration
in productivity growth is the improved labor market and reduced
natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU) that we are seeing today.
The high-pressure economy, tight labor market, and gratifyingly low
unemployment rate are hard to envision without the productivity
speedup, which is largely driven by the technological revolutions in
data processing and data communications.
A possible macroeconomic consequence of the computerization of
American business is a decline in the inventory-fluctuation-driven
component of the business cycle. Already the decline in aggregate in-
ventory-to-shipments ratios in manufacturing is substantial. How-
ever, we have not yet seen whether theoretical predictions that a
leaner inventory chain means a smaller business cycle come true.
Another possible macroeconomic consequence is increased financial
market volatility, which would take the form of both a faster and
more complete response of financial markets to news and a faster
and more exaggerated response of financial markets to noise. This is
worth worrying about because of its potential significance for the
making of economic policy. But as of yet we have no real data with
which to assess this possibility.
This paper attempts to provide interested readers with a roadmap to
guide them through the issues involved in thinking about our modern
technological revolutions, structural change, and macroeconomic per-
formance. After this first, introductory section, section II steps back and
provides a historical perspective on technological revolutions, struc-
tural change, and macroeconomic performancethe main point of
which is that in the past it has been remarkably difficult to draw clear
links between the first two and the third. Section III summarizes the
now near-complete consensus that the acceleration in measured produc-
tivity growth in the U.S. in the mid-1990s is due primarily to informa-
tion technology; it further argues that these technologies have been
diffusing through the economy sufficiently slowly that we should see
measured trend productivity grow at its current, accelerated rates for a
decade or more; and it speculates about the relationship between mea-
sured and true productivity growth.
Section IV turns to the fall in the NAIRUthe natural rate of unem-
ployment, the unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation.
There is by now good reason to tentatively conclude that the NAIRU
has stronger links with the overall rate of productivity growth than166 DeLong
previously thought; if so, then the good performance of the labor mar-
ket in the 1990s is due, indirectly, to the revolution in information tech-
nology working through the rate of productivity growth.
Section V notes the fall in inventories that has taken place over the
past two decades as information technology has spread through Amer-
ican businesses, and speculates that the large component of the busi-
ness cycle that has been driven by errors in forecasting and inventory
pile-ups will diminish.
But not everything that is good about the macroeconomy is due to
information technology. And not everything that is due to information
technology that affects the macroeconomy is good. Section VI points
out that financial markets that appear more unstable may well also be a
result of the "new economy."
Section VII provides a very brief conclusion.
II.Structural Change and Macroeconomic Performance
The past hundred and fifty years have seen the world's advanced in-
dustrial economies shift from primarily agricultural to primarily in-
dustrial and now primarily service economies. They have seen
repeated technological revolutions, as one leading sector after an-
otherchemicals, electricity, autos, aircrafthas taken the lead in pro-
ductivity acceleration. They have seen the rise of sophisticated systems
of consumer credit that allow households to smooth their spending
over time. They have seen the rise of the modern social insurance state
to serve as a sea-anchor for the economy by virtue of the large relative
size of its spending programs. They have seen the rise of systems
of deposit insurance to reduce the probability of a massive chain of
bankruptcies and thus a full-fledged financial panic. They have
seen the government take on responsibility for managing the macro-
economy.
Yet in spite of all these structural changes, the American business cy-
cle in the second half of the twentieth century has looked remarkably
like the American business cycle in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Arthur Burns (1960) could confidently predict that better
macroeconomic policy and structural change meant that "the business
cycle is unlikely to be as troubling or disturbing to our children as it
once was to our fathers."5 But the best available evidence is that Burns
was more wrong than right. We hope that better macroeconomic policy
has eliminated the risk of another Great Depression.6 But it is veryDo We Have a "New" Macroeconomy? 167
difficult to show convincingly any significant reduction in the sizeof
the business cycle on comparing the pre-Depression with the post-
World War II period.
Table 5.1 reports Romer's (1999) estimates of business-cyclevolatility
as estimated by the standarddeviation of the annual percentage
change in consistent estimates of four key macroeconomicvariables:
industrial production, real GDP, commodity production, and the per-
centage-point change in the unemployment rate. The effect of the Great
Depression in making business cycles during the 1920-1940 interwar
period far larger than in either of the other two is clear. It is alsoclear
that these point estimates of volatility are higher before WorldWar I:
27% higher for unemployment, 24% higher for industrialproduction,
20% higher for real GDP, and 6% higher for commodityproduction.
But the degree of stabilization is small, especially consideringthe mag-
nitude of structural change.
Even though the business cycle has been almost asvolatile since
World War II as before World War I, its pattern has undergone some
changes. Back before World War I the average business-cycle expan-
sion lasted less than three years. Since World War II it haslasted more
than four and a half years, as table 5.2 shows.
Why have expansions been longer in recent years? Romer attributes
thisI believe correctlyto successful management shocksby the
Federal Reserve, which has managed to smooth out and counteract
downward disturbances to demand that would have generated reces-
sions in previous years.
Why has the business cycle not been less volatile if the Federal Re-
serve has successfully leaned againstthe prevailing economic wind?
Because even though it has successfully damped somedisturbances,
the Federal Reserve itself has caused other disturbances.Most
post-World War II recessions have arisen because the Federal Reserve
has concluded that it is time to fight inflation even at the risk of a reces-
sion. Back before World War I such inflation-control recessions were
nonexistent.
The bottom line is that the business cycle has been with usfor a very
long time, in spite of mammoth changes in economic structureand in
technology The business cycles we experience today are still very close
in structure and development to those analyzed in Burnsand Mitchell
(1946), or indeed in Juglar (1916). So we cannot anticipate that anytech-
nological revolution would overthrow all of macroeconomics.The
new macroeconomy will be like theold in structure, with the principal168 DeLong
Table 5.1
Standard deviations of annual changes in macroeconomic variables
effects seen in the relative importance of different factors and the rela-
tive size of summary parameter values.
III.The Sharp Acceleration in Productivity Growth
In the nonfarm business sectorthe part of theeconomy on which pro-
ductivity studies typically focusoutputper labor hour rose between
1995 and 2000 at 2.5% per year, more than double thepace seen in the
preceding quarter century since 1970. This acceleration of productivity
growth raises for the first time in a generation the likelihood ofreason-
ably rapid and broad-based real income growth, if the jumpin produc-
tivity growth can be sustained. In the longrun, productivity growth
and average income growth must correspond. Anera like that of
1970-1995 in which productivity growth is slow must be, in Paul
Krugman's (1989) phrase, an "age of diminished expectations."
The case for attributing this acceleration in productivity growthto
the technological revolutions in information technology isnow very
strong. If this attribution is correct, then this reacceleration of produc-
tivity growth is the most significant macroeconomicconsequence of
the "new economy," and one that all by itself justifies focusing much
attention on computers and communications.
Back before 1995 critics of visionaries whosaw the computer as
transforming the world pointed to slow and anemic growth inaggre-
gate labor productivity. The end of the 1960s saw the Americanecon-
omy undergo an aggregate productivity slowdown, in which the trend
growth rate of labor productivity fell by more than half. It seemedun-
reasonable that what computer visionaries were toutingas an extraor-
dinary advance in technological capabilities should be accompanied
by a record-breaking slowdown in economic growth. As Nobel Prize-
winning MIT economist Robert Solow posed the question, ifthe
Standard deviation (%)
Variable 1886-1916 1920-1940 1948-1997
Industrial production 6.2 16.0 5.0
Real GDP 3.0 7.1 2.5
Commodity production 5.2 9.0 4.9
Unemployment 1.4 NA 1.1
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Table 5.2
Average length of business-cycle phases
Source: Romer (1994), updated.
computer is so important, "how come we see the computerrevolution
everywhere but in the [aggregate] productivity statistics?"
After Solow's question, productivity performance worsened still fur-
ther. In the decade and a half before Solow asked his question in 1987
output per hour grew at 1.1% per year. In the eight yearsafter 1987 out-
put per worker grew at only 0.8% per year.
This productivity paradox was sharpened because at the microeco-
nomic level economists and business analysts had no problemfinding
that investments in high technology had enormous productivity
benefits. MIT economist Erik Brynjolffson and his coauthors (Bryn-
jolffson (1993), Brynjolffson and Hitt (1996, 2000), and Brynjolffsonand
Yang (1999)) found typical rates of return on investments in computers
and networks of more than 50% per year. Firms that investedheavily in
information technology and transformed their internal structures so
that they could use their new technological capabilities flourishedin
the 1980s and 1990sand their lagging competitors did not.8
However, as Federal Reserve Board economists Oliner and Sichel
(1994) pointed out in the early 1990s, the then failure to see the com-
puter revolution in the aggregate productivity statisticsshould not
have come as a surprise.9 In the 1970s and 1980s the computerindustry
was simply too small a share ofthe economy and its output was not
growing fast enough for it to have a large effect on aggregateproduc-
tivity. According to their estimates, in the 1980s informationtechnol-
ogy capitalcomputer hardware,software, and communications
equipmentaccounted for 3.3% of the income earned in the economy,
and the price-adjusted information technology capital stock was grow-
ing at only 14% per year. You multiply these two numberstogether to
get an estimate of the contribution of the informationtechnology sector
to economic growth: in this case, a contribution of0.49% per year.
But beginning in 1992, the American economy began an extraor-
dinary investment boom. From 1992 to 2000, real businessfixed
Average length (months)
Phases 1886-1916 1920-1940 1948-2000
Recessions 9.7 14.0 10.7
Expansions 34.0 31.6 55.9170 DeLong
investment grew at 11% per year, with more than half of the additional
investment going into computers and related equipment. Andas the
information technology investment boom took hold, productivity
growth and growth in real GDP accelerated as well. Real GDProse by
an average of 3.9% per year between 1995 and 2000. Nonfarm business
measured labor productivitymeasured output per hour worked
grew at 2.7% per year.
Initially some economistsmost prominentamong them Robert J.
Gordon'°doubted that the acceleration in labor productivity growth
in the 1990s was anything more than an unsustainable cyclical phe-
nomenon. Indeed, as figure 5.2 shows, labor productivity can exhibit
large swings from year to year: the boom in productivity growth in
1992 was a flash in the pan (although it did give rise toa series of pa-
pers on the "jobless recovery"). The "morning in America" boom in
productivity growth of 1983-1986 was also not sustained, at least in
part because of high government budget deficits that reduced capital
accumulation. What reason is there to believe that this boom in thesec-
ond half of the 1990s is different?
The most powerful reason to believe that this acceleration ofaggre-
gate productivity growth is permanent, and not a flash in thepan,
comes from the underlying growth accounting of the impact of the in-
formation technology revolution. Back in the 1980s information tech-
nology capital accounted for 3.3% of income earned in theeconomy;
today, according to Oliner and Sichel (2000), it accounts for 7.0% of in-
come earned. Back in the 1980s the economy's stock of information
technology capital was growing at 14% per year; today, according to
Oliner and Sichel (2000), it is growing at 20% peryear. Multiply these
two sets of numbers together to find that the increase in the economy's
information technology capital stock was responsible for 0.5%per year
of economic growth in the late 1980s, and for 1.4% peryear of economic
growth today.1'
At this growth-accounting level of analysis, all of these factorsare
highly persistent. The rate of growth of the economy's information
technology capital stock will not slow down rapidlyor immediately.
For one thing, the same number of dollars spenton computers or com-
munication equipment today deliver perhaps three timesas much
in the way of real useful capital as they did five yearsago because
of the extraordinary fall in computer and communications equip-
ment prices.'2 Even simple use of amortization funds to replace obso-1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Figure 5.2
Annual labor productivity growth.
lete computers wifi generate enormous rates of increase in the capital
stock.
Moreover, there is every reason to think that the fall in computer and
communications equipment prices wifi continue. The pace of techno-
logical advance in information technology has been well described for
three decades by what has come to be called Moore's lawthe rule of
thumb that Intel cofounder Gordon Moore set out a generation ago,
that the density of circuits we can place on a chip of silicon doubles
every eighteen months with little or no significant increase in cost.
Moore's law has held for thirty years; it looks like it wifi hold for an-
other ten at least. Moore's law means that today's computers have
66,000 times the processing power of the computers of 1975. It means
that in ten years computers will be approximately 10 million times
more powerful than those of 1975 at roughly constant cost. The in-
stalled base of information processing power has increased at least
1 millionfold since the end of the era of electromechanical calculators in












Do We Have a "New" Macroeconomy? 171172 DeLong
ing and data communications equipment manufacture have the poten-
tial to have a large impact on overall productivity growth, as longas
the share of total income attributable to computer capitalthemar-
ginal product of this form of investmentdoes not collapse.
Will the share of total income attributable to computer capital col-
lapse? Probably not. One might wonder whether rapid improvements
in a particular branch of industry will rapidly run into diminishing re-
turns. The first candlepower of light one can produce after darkwith
a candle or an oil lamp steady enough to read byis a really big deal.
The ten-thousandth is not. Extraordinary productivity growth in the
provision of lighting, according to Nordhaus (1997), has had only a
limited impact on overall standards of living because the price of light
fell much faster than the quantity of lighting rose. The share of total in-
come attributable to computer capital will remain constant only if the
productive value of the marginal computer declines no more rapidly in
percentage terms than the total computer capital stock increases. In
theory there is no reason that the productive value of the marginal
computer might not decline very rapidly indeed, and the value of com-
puter services fall faster than the stock of computer capital providing
those services grows.
In practice this seems very unlikely to be the case. As John Zysman
has pointed out, one thing that makes computers likely to fit Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg's (1995) definition of a true engine of growth,a true
general purpose technology, is that each sequential fall in the price of
computers has been accompanied by an exponential increase in the de-
mand for computers because it makes feasible a whole new set of capa-
bilities and uses.
Consider: the first, very expensive computers produced tables useful
for calculating artillery trajectories and were of use only to govern-
ments with special-purpose needs for intensive calculation. Back in
those days the primary meaning of "computer" was someone who
worked on the Manhattan Project performing repetitive calculations. It
is in that age that we have Thomas Watson's declaration that the world
demand for computers is surely less than ten.
The second generation of somewhat cheaper computers founda use
not in making sophisticated calculations, but in making the extremely
large number of simple calculations needed by the Census Department
and by the human resource departments of large corporations. The
third generation of computers was used to stuff data into and pull data
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insurance systems, and the like. Computers came to American busi-
ness as word processors and what-if machines: devices to answer ques-
tions like "what if this paragraph looked like that?" or "what if the
growth rate were twice as fast?" Now computers have become embed-
ded into objects as sensors and controllers. And computers have be-
come networked, for paralleling the revolution in data processing
capacity has been a similar revolution in data communications
capacity.
At each stage, the fall in the price of computers has been marked not
by a modest but by an enormous expansion of the uses to which these
machines are put. There is no reason to anticipate that this will change.
And so there is no reason to look for a slowdown in the com-
puter-driven component of productivity growth.
Left to one side so far have been all of the complicated and unre-
solved issues surrounding the measurement of outputthings that
lead economists like William Nordhaus to throw the construction, ser-
vices, government, and finance, insurance, and real estate sectors of the
economy overboard as far as productivity calculations are concerned,
and to focus on the remaining sectors, which he calls "well-measured
output." As Alan Blinder (2000) puts it, there are large chunks of the
economy in which productivity growth is not well measured at all.
Many of these chunks are ones in which we would expect computer in-
vestment to yield substantial gains. Are we measuring them all? The
conclusion has to be "no": "retailing over the Internet may offer many
benefits to consumers (examples: cheaper comparison shopping,
24-hour availability, no travel costs, etc.), but such gains will never
be counted in GDP, and hence will never appear in the productivity
13
IV.The Fall in the Natural Rate of Unemployment
Back at the start of the 1990s most macroeconomists estimated that the
economy's natural rate of unemployment was between 6.5% and 7.0%.
If unemployment fell below that level, it was argued, inflation would
begin to accelerate. Thus a Federal Reserve that wished to avoid major
recessions by maintaining the public's confidence in its lack of toler-
ance for inflation could not afford to let the unemployment ratefall be-
low 6.5%.
These estimates were based on long historical experience, summa-





ment in the U.S. economy since 1960. In the 1960s inflation increased
when the unemployment rate fell below 5.5%. In the early 1970s, it
seemed as though inflation fell when the unemployment rate rose
above 5.5%, but then came the major accelerations in inflation pro-
duced by the oil price shock of 1973, and by the late 1970s it seemed as
though it required an unemployment rate of 6.5% or more to put
downward pressure on inflation.
In the 1980s, the workings of the labor market seemed worse: only
when unemployment rose above 7% in the early 1980s did inflation fall
noticeably. And in the late 1980s and early 1990s it seemed as though
inflation rose whenever the unemployment rate fell below 6.5%, and
fell when the unemployment rate rose above 6.5%.'
Just about the time in the mid-i 990s when the aggregate rate of pro-
ductivity growth began to boom, the comovements of inflation and un-
employment went off track. The fall in unemployment to 6% in the
mid-1990s did not lead to any acceleration in inflation, nor did the fall
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year and a half or so, as the unemployment ratehas fallen to 4%, have
there been any signs of rising inflation.
Macroeconomists call this particular set point of the economythe
rate of unemployment above which inflation tends to fall,and below
which inflation tends to risethe natural rate of unemployment, or alter-
natively (for those who wish to avoid the positive connotations carried
by the word "natural") the NAIRU, an acronym for "non-accelerat-
ing-inflation rate of unemployment." In theearly 1970s most
macroeconomists thought the NAIRU was in the range of 5% to 5.5%.
By the early 1990s most macroeconomists thought it was in the rangeof
6% to 7%. So nearly all macroeconomists have been surprised by the
stunningly swift fall in the NAIRU down to somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of 4.5% by the late 1990s.
By now the deviation between what inflation is and what onewould
have predicted inflation would be from the pre-1990s pattern is sub-
stantial. The most straightforward way to see the magnitude of the de-
viation is to take the simplest model for inflationsetting the change in
the inflation rate to be a function of the lagged unemployment rate
aloneand forecast what the current inflation rate would be if the un-
employment rate had followed its historical path and if the previous
pattern had continued to hold. As figure 5.4 shows, we wouldthen ex-
pect the inflation rate this year to be nearly 6%, instead of the 2.5%that
the consensus forecast anticipates.
If the acceleration in productivity growth is the first, then this sharp
fall in the NAIRU and sharp improvement in the economy's in-
flation-unemployment trade-off is the second major macroeconomic
structural break seen in the 1990s. There is considerable confidence that
the productivity growth acceleration could be traced to the revolutions
in data processing and data communications. To what can we trace the
fall in the NAIRU?
It is difficult to trace the fall in the NAIRU directly to "new econ-
omy" factors. It is simply not plausible to argue that online job searches
have made the labor market's frictions less important.15 On the other
hand, it is equally difficult to trace the fall in the NAIRU to demo-
graphic factors affecting the composition of the labor force or to
changes in work organization. Demographic factors' plausible effects
are an order of magnitude too small. And the timingis wrong to ac-
count for a large, sudden fall in the NAIRU in less than a decade.16
It is, however, possible that the natural rate of unemployment is
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Figure 5.4
What if inflation since 1993 had followed its previous pattern?
slow productivity growth from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990ssaw a
relatively high natural rate. By contrast, rapid productivity growth be-
fore 1973 and after 1995 has been associated witha lower natural rate.
If workers' aspirations for real wage growth themselves dependon the
rate of unemployment and do not depend directly on productivity
growth, then a speedup in productivity growth wifi reduce the natural
rate.
If productivity growth is slow, then a low rate of unemployment will
lead workers to demand high real wage increasesrealwage increases
above the rate of productivity growth. But firms cannot continuously
grant real wage increases higher than the rate of productivity growth
and still remain profitable. Long before their profits disappear, they
will respond to the higher real wage growth aspirations and demands
by economizing on workers. Unemployment will rise until theaverage
unemployment rate is high enough to curb worker aspirations for real
wage growth to a level consistent with trend productivity growth.
With a higher rate of productivity growth, firmscan afford to pay
higher real wage increases without going bankrupt. The unemploy-
ment rate consistent with real wage growth aspirations that matchpro-
ductivity is lower. Hence an economy with higher productivity growth
has a lower natural rate of unemployment.Do We Have a "New" Macroeconomy? 177
There is no strong microeconomic evidence for this model in any
form. Moreover, it does not meet modern macroeconomists' require-
ment that agents in models exhibit rational expectations. Workers
whose real wage growth aspirations depend not on the rate of produc-
tivity growth but on the unemployment rate alone are myopic and ir-
rational. But looking back over the past forty years, there is a remark-
able qualitative fit between the high-productivity-growth, low-NAIRU
1960s and 1990s and the low-productivity-growth, high-NAIRU 1970s
and 1980s.
The attribution of the fall in the NAIRU in the 1990s to the "new
economy"as an indirect consequence of the acceleration in produc-
tivity growthis plausible and enticing, but far from proven.
V.Manufacturing Inventories in the Economy
To the extent that modern computer and communications technologies
can be put to work as true informationtechnologies, they will improve
businesses' abilities to know about and manage their goods in the pipe-
line from initial raw materials to final sales. Individual firms will make
fewer mistakes in forecasting demand for their own products, and in
aggregate the total inventories in the economy will be less likely to un-
expectedly accumulate or unexpectedly collapse in response to a mis-
match between production and demand.
Managers claim that one of the principal benefits of new com-
puter-and-communications technologies is better inventory control.
Businesses today can control their inventories much more effectively.
Interest and storage costs are lower. Stockouts are less frequent, and
less costly.
This is potentially important for the size of the business cycle. As
Blinder (1981) pointed out, in a typical recession the fall in inventory
investment is between 50% and 100% of the peak-to-trough fall in real
GDP. To a large extent, post-World War II recessions are episodes in
which businesses have decided or have found that their inventories are
too large, and have cut back drastically on production in order toliqui-
date some of these excess inventories. Significantly diminish the ampli-
tude of aggregate mistakes in inventory accumulation, and you
promise to significantly diminish the magnitude of fluctuations in ag-
gregate demand, production, and employment as well.
It is in this context that it is interesting to note (figure 5.5) that the ra-
tio of inventory to shipments in manufacturing has been on a steep de-









Inventory-to-shipments ratios in manufacturing.
concerned. Today's durable manufacturers hold only two-thirdsas
much inventory relative to their shipments as they held in the 1970s.
Today's nondurable manufacturers hold one-fifth less inventory in
proportion to sales than they did in the 1970s.
Now it would surely be a mistake to attribute all of this relative
decline in inventories to the "new economy." Before therewas a new
economy, after all, there was a "Japanese challenge": American firms
scrambled to develop and implement "lean production" systems
that economized on inventories and achieved much greater control
over materials flow and quality (see Womack 1991). But surely if infor-
mation technologies are worthy of their name at all, they will improve
business knowledge of what is going on inside the firm, and reduce the
size of the inventory buffers needed to keep production running
smoothly.
If the reduction in inventories made possible by modern information
and communications technologies is close to reaching its limit, thenwe
can expect that one consequence of the new economy is to moderate
the inventory-driven portion of the business cycle. If the reduction in
inventories has just begunif improved information flow will truly
make the new economy a just-in-time economythenwe can expect
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reduced. If Blinder's (1981) assessment of the importance of invento-
ries remains true, this would be a significant gain in macroeconomic
performance.
VI.Asset Markets
If we look far back in history at the long bull runs of the American
stock market-1890-1910, or 1920-1930, or 1950-1970we see (figure
5.6) that for each 10% that the real value of dividends rise over a
twenty-year period, the real value of stock prices tends to rise by 15%.
But if we look just at the most recent bull marketthe one that started
in 1982we find that a market-wide rise in dividends of 10% produces
not a 15% but a 26% increase in stock prices. The runup in stock prices
during the 1920s was extraordinary, but in real terms the increase in
dividends paid out in the 1920s, and the increase in corporate
profitability, was more than half of the increase in real stock market val-
ues. The runup in stock prices during the 1950sand 1960s was extraor-
dinary too, but in real terms increases in dividends and in earnings
were two-thirds as large as the increase in real values.
20*Dividend
- Price
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The most recent bull market, as measured by the S&P composite in-
dex, is the largest: a more than sevenfold increase in real values. Yet
real dividends paid on a pro-rata share of the S&P composite index
have risen by less than 30% since the early 1980s. And earningson a
pro-rata share have increased by less than 50%.
Any economist examining this pattern must reach one of two conclu-
sions (or hedge his or her bets by taking a position between them). The
first is that for a century the stock market has been grossly under-
pricedhas discounted the risk associated with owning equities ata
much too high rate. It is only now that equity valuations are "fair" in
the sense of promising expected real returns on stocks akin to those on
bonds plus a small extra risk premium. The second is that the stock
market today is subject to irrational exuberance on a scale never before
seen in America.'7
If the second conclusion is correct, what role has the "new economy"
played in drawing tighter limits around the stabilizing potential of
arbitrage'8 and in diminishing the information about fundamentals in
the hands of the marginal investor? Barber and Odean (2001) point out
that experimental economists have spelled out conditions under which
markets are most vulnerable to prolonged mispricing and to specula-
tive bubbles, and that our current stock market as it has been fueled by
the growth of online trading and online information appears to meet
all of them. Stock markets have managed to generate prolonged
mispricing and spectacular crashes in the absence of the Internet in the
past. But there is definitely reason to worry that the extra information
about and access to the stock market provided by the information tech-
nology revolution has not led to a more informed marginal investor,or
to a market that is a better judge of fundamental values.
VII.Conclusion
Of the four principal shifts in the structure of the macroeconomy that
we have examined here, we can be confident that the "new economy"
is responsible for the first: the acceleration in productivity growth. We
can also be confident that this acceleration in productivity growth is
not going to evaporate quickly: the growth-accounting fundamentals
that have led the technological revolution in data communications and
data processing to boost aggregate productivity growth change only
slowly. Moore's law is not going to vanish tomorrow. Nor is the econ-
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The second shiftthe sharp and sudden fall in the NAIRUis less
clearly attributable to the "new economy." There is no other plausible
candidate to account for the swift reduction in the rate of unemploy-
ment consistent with stable inflation. But there is little direct evidence
in favor of a link between faster productivity growth and a reduced
NAIRU. And the models that predict such an association do not meet
macroeconomists' requirement of rational expectations.
The third shiftthe reduction in inventoriesis driven by the infor-
mation technology revolution as well as by other factors, and has been
ongoing for a generation. How much of it is due directly to information
technology is unknown. And we have not yet been able to see whether
macroeconomic benefits in terms of reduced business cycle amplitude
wifi follow from the leaner inventory pipeline that our economy is
moving to.
The fourth shiftthe bad shift, the increase in the volatility of the
stock marketis in some sense completely due to the "new economy."
With no belief in the new economy, there would have been no doubling
of the NASDAQ index in four monthsand no subsequent halving of
the index in the year up to March 2001. The deeper question is whether
our stock market works markedly worse as a socialcapital allocation
mechanism now than it worked a generation ago because it has been
corrupted by an unusual degree of speculative excess, and how much
of this speculative excess is due to the information technology revolu-
tion. And for that question there is no answer.
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See Morgenson (2001).
See Shiller (2000). There is good reason to suspect that the inflow of investors into the
market during the 1990s has made it more vulnerable and more volatile. See Barber and
Odean (2001).
See Cohen, DeLong, and Zysman (2000).
See Landes (1969).
See also Delong and Summers (1986), whose confident belief that we could see the ef-
fects of structural change in the reduced size of the business cycle were fatally under-
mined by Romer (1994, 1999).182 DeLong
Chiefly a better understanding of the circumstances under which fixed-exchange-rate
systems like the gold standards can be destabilizing, fiscal automatic stabilizers to cush-
ion the effects of a fall in income on demand, deposit insurance to serve as a firebreak to
keep the system of financial intermediation from collapse, and a central bank that focuses
enough attention on the money stock and does not make the false assumption that a low,
safe, short, nominal interest rate means that credit is easy. On the other hand, anyone
looking at the current situation of Japan must worry that even if economists know how to
avoid deep depressions, politicians may not always listen to them.
Productivity growth starting in the early 1970s was anomalously and unexpectedly
lowa phenomenon called the productivity slowdown. It is depressing to note that even
now the causes of the productivity slowdown and of its persistence are not well under-
stood. See Fischer (1988).
See Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996); Brynjolfsson (1993).
An argument developed at greater length in Sichel (1997).
See Gordon (2000). At one level the differences between Gordon and the others are
simply differences of emphasis: what is large enough for us to pay attention to? At an-
other level, a key difference revolves around how one accounts for the effect of the busi-
ness cycle, and what one would expect the effect of a fall in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment to be on potential output. According to Oliner and Sichel's growth-accounting
model, a 2.5-percentage-point fall in the natural rate would boost potential output by the
increase in employment times the share of income accruing to labora boost to potential
output of perhaps 1.5%. According to Gordon's more macro-oriented model, a 2.5-
percentage-point fall in the natural rate would boost potential output by the Okun's law
coefficient of 2.5 times the change in the unemployment ratea boost to potential output
of 6.2%. I come down on the side of the first approach, largely because I believe that the
effect on potential output could not be as large as Okun's law suggests without generat-
ing markedly higher inflation, and we know that this decline in unemployment is associ-
ated with a fall in the natural rate and has not generated inflation. But it is not yet conclu-
sively clear that Gordon's analysis is wrong.
Oliner and Sichel's conclusions are very similar to those of Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000). Both are backed up and strengthened in a very interesting series of papers by
Hordhaus (2000a, 2000b, 2001) that I have not yet had a chance to fully digest.
See Triplett (1999a, 1999b).
Many of these issues are addressed to some extent in Boskin et al. (1997).
For a more formal econometric analysis of the time-varying natural rate of unem-
ploymentone that stresses the uncertainty surrounding our estimate of the natural rate
at any moment in timesee Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997).
See Autor (2001).
See Katz and Krueger (1999).
The conclusion reached by Robert Shiller (2000), whb backs up his quantitative esti-
mates of fundamental values with a great deal of thick description of the thought pro-
cesses of market participants. Of course, only the thought processes of the marginal
agent are truly relevant to assessing the information content of prices.
A way of thinking about the problem of noise trading developed by Shleifer and
Vishny (1997).Do We Have a "New" Macroeconomy? 183
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